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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
For thousands of years, people have tried to develop various means of assuring the authen-
ticity Of a message carried by an untrusted third party. With the development of telecommuni-
cation, this became a technical challenge. The proliferation of digital communication, with its 
speed and ease of use, has given rise to increasingly sophisticated authentication mechanisms. 
Inevitably, the sophistication of attackers (those who wish to obtain unauthorized access to the 
message) has also increased, s0 there is a continuing need for new methods of authentication. 
This thesis outlines an approach for authentication of devices on a local network based 
on the assumption that none of the digital information can be trusted. Instead, the analog 
characteristics of the signal transmitted on the network are considered. This leads to a device 
"fingerprint" which is independent Of the information transmitted. 
1.1 The security problem 
Broadly speaking, one may divide the general area of "computer security" into three cate-
gories of problem, namely those of confidentiality, availability, and integrity. [4] 
Confidentiality refers simply to the protection of information from the view of unauthorized 
parties. The need for confidentiality in any number of government, military, commcercial, and 
academic applications is clear. Various mechanisms are used to maintain confidentiality. The 
contents of a data file may be encrypted so that only someone in possession of a password or 
cryptographic key may access it. Access to data storage devices may also be controlled; this 
can hide the very existence of the data as well as the content. 
When we speak of availability, we mean the ability to access or use information. Attacks 
against availablity have become well-known due to recent publicity. Known as denial-of-service 
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attacks, they usually involve either the malicious over-consumption of resources such as network 
bandwidth Or computational power, or the disruption of a network (either physically or via 
corruption of configuration information). 
The issue of integrity revolves around two questions: Is the message received the same as 
the message which was sent? And did the message in fact come from its supposed origin? 
Of course, data integrity may be violated by simple transmission error, and many checksum 
schemes exist to counter such errors. Various means exist to guard against malicious attacks 
on data integrity; these include data access control and cryptographic signatures. There are 
also many mechanisms t0 detect violations of data integrity and source integrity. 
1.2 The DILON concept 
From a security point of view, the main question addressed in this thesis is one of source 
integrity. We want t0 ensure that a message is in fact coming from its apparent origin. The 
"message" may be any sort of digital information. 
We will concern ourselves with local networks; in fact, we consider only a single transmission 
step. One device generates the message and transmits it to a network medium (which might be 
a cable or a wireless broadcast). A second device receives the message from the transmission 
medium. 
The second device is very often a network router or switch to which both physical and 
remote access are carefully controlled. If this device can make a determination of the authen-
ticity of the message source, that information can be used to enhance overall security of the 
network. 
Data transmission protocols are roughly divided into layers of abstraction. The highest 
layer, closest to the user, is known as the application lager, and many of the protocols included 
in it are familiar to even casual computer users: FTP, DNS, HTTP, telnet, SSH and so forth. 
Many of these protocols provide the final recipient with some means of ensuring (or at least 
enhancing) data and source integrity. However, these schemes are of limited usefulness to an 
intermediate device such as a router. 
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Below the application layer are the transport layer and the networl~ layer. The transport 
layer includes protocols such as TCP and UDP; the network layer is almost exclusively the 
Internet protcol (IP) either IPv4, or more recently, IPv6. 
The transport and network layers include both the origin and destination addresses of the 
message. In this context, the "address" is usually the IP address. This can provide some 
information about source integrity if, at a particular router or switch port, we see traffic 
coming from an IP address which is not authorized on that port, an alarm condition may 
be raised. However, a malicious attacker will almost certainly alter the IP address of the 
unauthorized device to match that of the authorized device. 
The lowest protocol layer, closest to the physical transmission medium, is the data lin1~ 
layer. It is the data link protocol that encapsulates all higher layers and determines the actual 
signal sent along the transmission medium. The most familiar data link protocols are the 
various types of ethernet; others include token rings, PPP, and FDDI. 
Because it is the lowest level of abstraction, the data link layer is also sometimes referred to 
as layer one. It is the layer with which we will concern ourselves in this thesis, and it provides 
the project's name: Detecting Intrusions at Layer One, or DILON. 
The data layer also includes a type of address information. In this case, it is the so-called 
hardware address, also known as the MAC address. l The name refers to the fact that (in 
most cases) this address is permanently programmed into the device when it is manufactured. 
However, user-programmable devices are available, and an attacker would likely use one in 
order to match the hardware address of the authorized device. 
The DILON approach to ascertaining source integrity does not rely on any address infor-
mation. Instead, the analog characteristics of the signal are monitored. The general idea is as 
follows. 
An ethernet switch or router is equipped with DILON technology. When a new authorized 
device is introduced to the network, a brief training period allows the DILON-enabled switch 
to obtain and store a "fingerprint" or "voiceprint" of the device. Then, over the course of 
1 MAC stands for "media access control." 
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normal operation, a new voiceprint may be obtained from the signal and compared to the 
stored version. 
A sudden change might be an indication of an unauthorized device on the network. In the 
case of a wired network, it could also be due to slight alteration of the signal resulting from an 
unauthorized tap on the line. One can imagine that other changes, either sudden or gradual, 
might indicate impending device failure, allowing for preemptive maintenance. 
The central hypothesis here is that every device has its own unique (or nearly unique) signal 
characteristics. Just as the human ear is capable of distinguishing between two voices reading 
the same text, a DILON device should be able to distinguish between two devices transmitting 
the same data. 
One can certainly imagine that two devices of different design might have detectable dif-
ferences in the signal. We shall see that this is in fact the case. However, we will also see 
that it is very often possible to distinguish two devices of the same brand and model these 
differences are usually less extreme, and presumably result from variations within component 
and manufacturing tolerances. 
1.3 Past and related work 
The importance of the problem of signal identification has grown with the proliferation of 
signal-generating devices. It was around the time of World War II when the identification of 
radars, radios, and other wireless signal sources became an important area of research. Most of 
the techniques developed rely on transient analysis, such as analysis of the power-on transient 
of a transmitter [10] . Analysis of these features, albeit via newer techniques, is still being 
researched [27]. These and other methods of signal classification are generally successful only 
when the transmitters are very different. 
Cellular telephone companies have a particular interest in identification of signal sources as 
a powerful means of preventing fraud [25] . However, the assocated research they have carried 
out is proprietary and generally unavailable. Some proposed schemes are public [14], but their 
effectiveness is dif~i.cult to ascertain. 
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Other work has also been done specifically to identify network devices based on physical 
characteristics. Some such work relies on special methods of embedding a fingerprint signal 
[24]. One project proposes the remote identification of computers by measuring clock skew 
[16]. This method is intriguing, but requires many hours of observation, and the success rate 
is somewhat unclear. 
A more extensive list of references to related work can be found in publications by the 
DILON researchers [9, 20]. 
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2. STATISTICAL FUNDAMENTALS 
This chapter provides a very brief review of some of the statistical concepts and methods 
used in the following chapters. Readers already familiar with this material may skip this 
chapter entirely. Those wishing more detail might consult an introductory text on signal 
processing (such as [22]), or on probability (such as [23]). 
2.1 Notation 
We summarize here the notation used throughout this thesis. 
Vectors and matrices will both be notated in bold face, and vectors will be assumed to be 
column vectors unless otherwise noted. We will use lower-case for vectors and upper-case for 
matrices. 
X = A = 
aln 
a21 a22 
aml amn 
~2.1~ 
Also, xT indicates the transform of a vector or matrix, and A-1 is the inverse of a square 
matrix. 
Time-series data will be noted as x(n) if it is scalar-valued, or x(n) if it is vector-valued. 
In discussions of probability, the notation E{•} will be used to denote the expectation value 
(see below) of the quantity inside the braces. 
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2.2 Time domain and frequency domain 
As described in Chapter 3, a DILON sample record consists of a time sequence of 10,000 
samples taken at a frequency of 1 GHz. The underlying signal is a continuous-time signal, 
but the record obtained through periodic sampling is a discrete-time signal. In other words, 
although the voltage on the line varies continuously, the signal that we will process is only 
defined at particular instants in time. 
The act of sampling (and thus converting from continuous-time to discrete-time), which 
in the present case is carried out by the oscilloscope, has a direct impact on the information 
which the signal can carry. In particular, the discrete-time signal can only convey signals 
with frequencies at or below one-half of the sampling rate. This cutoff frequency is commonly 
referred to as the Nyquist frequency.l 
Nyquist's sampling theorem (see, for example, [22] X3.2) furthermore states that if the 
original continuous-time signal is band-limited such that all of its frequency components lie 
below the Nyquist frequency, then it is uniquely represented by the discrete-time signal. In fact, 
care must be taken to ensure such band-limiting by filtering the continuous-time signal before 
sampling. If frequencies above the Nyquist frequency remain, they will manifest themselves in 
the discrete-time signal as "false" lower-frequency signals, a phenomenon known as aliaszng. 
The signal as obtained from the oscilloscope is atime-domain signal. However, a signal 
may also be represented in the frequency domain, that is, by the amount of power carried 
by individual frequencies in the signal. The exact nature of this spectrum, and of the trans-
formation necessary to obtain it from the time-domain signal, are determined in large part 
by whether the signal is continuous-time or discrete-time, and by whether the values it may 
take at any time vary continuously. (Because we are obtaining our data from a digital device 
with eight-bit sampling resolution, the voltage measurements may only take on certain discrete 
values; hence our signal is discrete on both the voltage and time axes.) 
The particular transformation of interest to us is the discrete Fourier transform, or DFT. 
The DFT allows us to obtain the spectrum of afinite-length time-domain signal. Details of 
l After H. Nyquist, who first set forth many of the ideas discussed in this section in [21]. 
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its computation can be found in [22] or another signal processing text. In any case, direct 
computation of the DFT is inefficient, and various fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithms 
have been developed. A thorough coverage of FFT algorithms can be found in [5]; we rely 
primarily on MA'rLAB's fft function. 
2.3 Distributions and density functions 
In the measurement of any variable x, there is a probability associated with each possible 
value. As an example, consider the measurement of the diameter of widgets coming from an 
assembly line. 
The widgets are designed to all have the same diameter. However, small variations in the 
manufacturing process will lead to the actual diameters departing slightly from the designed 
value; some may be just a bit larger, some a bit smaller, but the average should be near the 
desgined value. Also, small errors the measurement process itself will introduce some variation. 
This relationship between the possible measurements and the corresponding probabilities 
constitutes a probability distribution. Mathematically, the distribution function (or more pre-
cisely, the cumulative distribution function or cdf) is defined as 
Clearly, Fx (xo) is a monotonically increasing function that takes on a value of 1 as its argument 
becomes arbitrarily laxge. 
Another useful way of specifying a distribution is by way of its probability distribution 
function or pdf. It is defined as 
fx~x~ ~ dF~(x) 
dx 
(2.3) 
The integral of this function will give the probability of the measurement occurring between 
the limits of integration. In particular, note that 
f~ fx(x)dx = 1 (2.4) 
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Figure 2.1 The pdf (left) and cdf (right) of a normal distribution. 
/~~o 
J f~(x)dx = F~(xo). (2.5) 
One can imagine no end of possible distribution functions, and there are many which are 
appropriate to various situations. One that arises frequently in nature is the normal or gaussian 
distribution, which is defined by the pdf 
1 eXp ~ (x — !~)2 
/ 2 2Q2
(2.6) 
This is the familiar "bell curve" . It is defined entirely in terms of the quantities ~ (the mean) 
and ~2 (the variance) . Also frequently used is a- (the standard deviation) . The pdf and cdf 2 
of the normal distribution are illustrated in Fig. 2.1. 
A closely related distribution that arises when dealing with discrete variables is the binomial 
distribution. If a variable x may take on the values 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, then3
p~x _ ~~ _ ~~1 pkgn-k 1~ = 0, 1, 2, ... ~ n ~2.7~ 
where p -}- q = 1, so the distribution is entirely defined in terms of n and either p or q. If 
2 Note that the pdf of the normal distribution cannot be integrated in closed form to obtain the cdf. Numerical 
methods must be employed. 
3The notation (~) represents the binomial coefficient, and is equivalent to (n ~~,~, . 
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p = q = 0.5 and the number of observations N is very large, then the binomial distribution 
becomes a normal distribution with ~ = Np and ~2 = Npq. 
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3. DATA ACQUISITION AND PRE-PROCESSING 
The preliminary study was carried out using ten megabit/second ethernet. Although this 
is a largely deprecated technology, its relatively slow speed relieves the need for specialized 
data acquistion equipment, and provides an environment for proof-of-concept work. 
3.1 Testbed layout 
The data acquisition was carried out using a fairly simple system, a block diagram of 
which appears in Figure 3.1. The major components are two identical computers and a digital 
sampling oscilloscope. 
The computers are off-the-shelf PC-compatible machines running the GNU/Linux operat-
ing system. Linux, in addition to being cost-effective, provides a mature, well-developed set of 
tools for configuration and monitoring of network devices and traffic. One PC is equipped with 
the device under test (DUT). The other contains a specially tapped ethernet card (described 
below) as well as an IEEE-488 (GPIB) inteface card for communication with the oscilloscope. 
U 
Card Under Test 
DAQ Card 
m 
PC 1 
PC 2 
 J 
cHi p
cH2 Q~
Digital Oscilloscope 
Figure 3.1 Block diagram of the data acquisition system. 
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Ten Mbit/sec ethernet communication takes place across two of the four twisted pairs in 
category 5 ethernet cable; the other two pairs are unused. Rather than having a signal line 
and a ground line in each pair, a differential signal is used. Each ethernet device's transmit 
and receive ports are isolated from the transmission line by a signal transformer. 
The tapped ethernet card provides the means to monitor the waveform received from the 
DUT in the other computer. In order to avoid disturbing the signal and to gain access to an 
appropriate signal ground, the received signal is obtained from the transformer as indicated 
in Figure 3.1. The signals obtained, which may be designated RX-I- and RX-, are fed to the 
oscilloscope. 
The oscilloscope used is a Tektronix model TDS3054, which has a bandwidth of 500 MHz 
and is capable of sampling rates up to 5 GHz. During acquisition, the sampling rate was 
1 GHz; see section 3.2.2. Because the signal is differential, the oscilloscope's built-in math 
functions were used to create the signal (RX-}-) — (RX-), which constitutes the data actually 
recorded. 
3.2 Data acquisition process 
Before describing the method of data acquisition, we give a brief description of the signal 
itself. 
3.2.1 Anatomy of a 10 Mbit/sec ethernet frame 
In 10 Mb/s ethernet, the line is quiet when no data are being transmitted. (This is in 
contrast to other protocols, including 100 Mb/s and 1 Gb/s ethernet, which continue to trans- 
mit asynchronization signal even in the absence of data.) Because of the quiet line, every 
frame must begin with a synchronization signal. This signal is, in principle, identical in every 
ethernet frame, and so provides an ideal segment of data for the fingerprinting process. l
An example of the acquired data in its raw format is shown in Fig. 3.2. The first portion 
of the signal (prior to the trigger) shows a small amount of noise on the otherwise quiet 
l In protocols which use a sychronization signal between frames, specialized triggering mechanisms can be 
used to sample a portion of that signal for fingerprinting. 
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Figure 3.2 An example of raw 10 Mb/s frame premable data. 
line. The regular repeating wave at the beginning of the ethernet frame, which continues 
for approximately 6.5 ~.cs, is the synchronization signal (also known as the frame premable). 
The frame then continues with the source and destination addresses; the beginning of this 
information is seen at the end of the sample record. 
3.2.2 Retrieving and saving oscilloscope data 
In order to get the maximum possible time resolution, the sampling window is set to 10 ~.cs. 
This is the smallest available time scale that allows for capture of the entire frame preamble. 
Since the oscilloscope captures 10,000 data points on each sweep, the data sampling rate is 
1 GHz. 
The two signals coming into the oscilloscope are the two components of a differential signal. 
Because the line is silent between frames, a simple threshold trigger on either channel can be 
used to detect the beginning of the frame. The oscilloscope's math channel is used to create 
the signal (RX-f-) — (RX-), which is then recorded. 
As indicated in Fig. 3.1, the oscilloscope is attached to the computer via a GPIB interface 
for data collection. Under control of the computer, the oscilloscope waits for the next trigger, 
collects the data, and sends the contents of the math channel to the computer for storage. The 
process takes approximately one second. 
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Figure 3.3 A representative spectrum of the frame synchronization signal. 
In order to generate the necessary network traffic between computers, the machine contain-
ing the DUT sends an ICMP ping every second. This is the default timing of the GNU/Linux 
ping command; it was found that more frequent packets did not result in faster data acqui-
sition. The ping ICMP packet is small enough to be contained in a single ethernet frame, so 
the appearance of traffic on the line can be carefully controlled. 
3.3 Preparing data for analysis 
Before the data analysis can proceed, the raw data must be prepared. This process consists 
of trimming the data in the time domain, demeaning, and standardization. For many analysis 
methods, it is also preferable to work in the spectral domain, so a fast Fourier transform (FFT) 
is also performed on the data. 
In analyzing the 10 IVlbit/s ethernet data, we choose to examine the frame preamble because 
it must be identical in every frame. We have seen that this constitutes roughly the first 6.5 µs 
of the frame. However, closer inspection of the preamble reveals that there is some transient 
behavior at the beginning of the signal. It is possible that this transient signal contains solve 
fingerprinting information, and for a given experiment a decision must be made about whether 
to include it . 
When trimming the data for use in an experiment which compares spectral data, the 
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behavior of the FFT must also be taken into consideration. Several versions of the FFT 
algorithm exist; some of these require that the number of data points be a power of two, 
and will pad the data with zeros if necessary to achieve this. Other more sophisticated FFT 
algorithms (including the one used by MATLAB) do not sufFer from this shortcoming. [5] At 
any rate, we can trim the data to 4,096 (212) samples if necessary and still include a large 
segment of the preamble. 
Once the data axe trimmed, they are made to be zero-mean (the mean sample value is 
subtracted from each sample). We also enforce a unit standard deviation (the entire record is 
scaled by dividing each sample by the standard deviation of all samples). 
The FFT may then be applied to the time-domain data to obtain a spectrum. It may also 
be desirable in a particular experiment to average a number of sample records to reduce the 
amount of random noise in the signal; in most cases, this will be done in the time domain with 
the FFT following if spectral data are required. 
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4. SURVEY OF FINGERPRINTING METHODS 
This chapter provides a definition of the device fingerprinting problem, followed by a survey 
of various methods which have been explored by the DILON researchers. 
4.1 The fingerprinting problem 
As discussed in Chapter 1, our goal is t0 develop method Of obtaining a "fingerprint" or 
"voiceprint" of a network signal that can be easily stored during a supervised training phase. 
This stored fingerprint can then be compared to a new fingerprint obtained during signal 
monitoring. 
4.1.1 A simple signal model 
Although we will not deal with a formal signal model, it is important to explicitly state 
the components we expect to see. They are: 
• The "idealized" signal: the signal that carries the digital information as laid out in the 
protocol specifications. 
• Device-specific characteristics: small variations unique to a device, arising from its spe-
cific design and components. 
• Random noise. 
Obviously one can imagine more complex models, but this serves as a useful starting point for 
our investigation. The idea, of course, is that the idealized signal is the same for all devices. 
We hope to be able to identify the unique characteristics, separating them from the noise. 
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4.1.2 Misidentification of signals 
Regardless of the fingerprinting method, it is statistically inevitable that both false positive 
and false negative results will occur. In the DILON context, a false positive is an instance in 
which a test fails to recognize an intruder signal. By the same token, a false negative occurs 
when the test rejects the authorized device. 
The rates at which these types of error occur are, of course, dependent on the method. 
Because the tests are statistical in nature, it is possible to adjust confidence levels. As always, 
this is a tradeoff. The false positives are an annoyance, and could trigger an alarm that would 
needlessly disrupt normal network operation. Reducing the number of false positives, however, 
involves some degree of loosening the constraints of the test, thereby making it more likely 
that an intruder device would go undetected. 
However, the errors can be dealt with. For any particular test to be useful in a real-world 
situation, its inherent error rates must be understood. If we know that a test has (for example) 
a 3°~o false rejection rate, we might monitor the results of many tests and not raise an alarm 
until the reject rate reached 4°~0 or 5°~0 . 
Another more rigorous method of dealing with error rates and determining when to raise 
an alarm is sequential testing. This method will be discussed in X4.3. 
4.2 A variety of fingerprinting tools 
We present here the methods which, at the time of this writing, have received the most 
attention from the DILON researchers, including the author. This is a diverse selection of 
techniques which are based on work developed in a variety of fields. All of them, however, 
show some promise either for extracting features from the DILON signals or for directly dif-
ferentiating between them. 
4.2.1 The differential Fourier voiceprint 
The differential Fourier voiceprint, or DFV, was one of the first methods investigated by 
the DILON researchers. (6] It is relatively straightforward in both concept and computation. 
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4.2.1.1 Computation of the DFV 
In the DFV method, the signals are compared in the spectral domain. The original time-
domain data is trimmed (to contain only the frame preamble) and standardized (to zero mean 
and unit standard deviation) before transformation to the frequency domain. 
Consider two spectral samples taken from the authorized device, Val and Vat. We compute 
a baseline for our test: 
B = I ~Va1~2 — ~Va2~2 1 (4.1) 
Because the two spectra come from the same authorized device, B should be small relative to 
the spectra used to compute it. This is because the spectra Val and Vat share both generic 
and device-specific signal characteristics which will cancel in the subtraction. This leaves only 
the random noise component to contribute to B. 
Together, B and Val constitute the DFV. (The choice of Val Over Vat is, of course, arbitrary.) 
Given a new candidate signal, V', we use the DFV to compute 
B' _ ~~Va~12 — IV'121 
Our test now becomes a comparison of B and B'. 
We construct this test as a simple magnitude comparison: 
1 ifx>x~ 
h(x, x~) _ 
0 otherwise 
N 
n=1 
N 
n=1 
(4.2) 
Obviously, the total number of spectral bins N = r~ -}- r_ , so the values of r+ and r_ commu-
nicate the same information. In the following discussion, therefore, we will simplify by setting 
r = r+ and using that value for comparisons. 
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Figure 4.1 DFV computed against a single record from the authorized de-
vice. 
Also note that B and B' are directly derived from frequency magnitudes. It is common 
practice to treat these values as independent, so we can justify the bin-by-bin comparisons 
made b etween B and B' above. 
Now, if V' matches the stored DFV for a candidate device, we expect that r will be 
binomially distributed, with p = q = 0.5 (see Eq. 2.7) . This is intuitively reasonable as well 
if the differences between B and B' arise only from random noise, then we might well expect 
that their components would be so distributed. 
Recall that for a large N, a binomial distribution reduces to a normal distribution (see 
X2.3) . This allows us to directly choose a confidence level for the test. 
4.2.1.2 Results 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a typical simple application of the differential Fourier voiceprint to 
DILON spectra from two devices which were labeled as b5cl and b6c4. We treat b5cl as the 
authorized device and use two sample records from it as Val and Vat to compute B this is 
the blue curve in the figure. A single record from the intruder device b6c4 is then used as V' 
in the computation of B', which is plotted in red. 
Notice that the clearest difference between the two devices occurs in the lower frequency 
bins. This is also the range in which the majority of the energy of the idealized signal is found, 
and seems to indicate that this low-frequency region is the most useful for differentiating 
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Figure 4.3 The DFV r-value over time for two devices. 
between devices. 
In Figure 4.2, we use the same devices. However, the DFV was computed using an average 
of 25 spectral records from the authorized device in place of Val in (4.1) . This has the effect of 
removing noise while maintaining device-specific features. Single records are still used for Vat 
and V'. From the graph, it is clear that this averaging has increased the signal differentiation, 
especially in the range of frequencies up to about 35 MHz. 
Finally, in Figure 4.3, we show the result of a series of tests. The baseline B was computed 
as it was for Figure 4.1 (that is, with no averaging) . Then the DFV was computed for a 
sequence of 500 sample records from each of the two devices. For each DFV, the r-value is 
plotted; the blue curve shows the r-value of the authorized device over time, and the red curve 
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shows that of the intruder device. Although some overlap does occur, the two devices are quite 
clearly separated. 
There are a couple of features worth noting about this graph as they differ somewhat from 
the expectations outlined in the previous section. First, because the number of samples is 
N = 200, we would expect the mean r-value of the authorized device to be close to 100. 
However, it is clearly somewhat lower. Also, it appears that the distribution is not symmetric 
about the mean. These two facts are consistent with a binomial distribution; however, it 
appears that our assumption that p = q = 0.5 was incorrect. 
In some sense, this isn't entirely surprising. Because the r-value cannot ever be lower than 
zero, it should come from a distribution with that same feature. Such distributions include 
the Rayleigh and Maxwell-Boltzmann distributions. (See a text such as [23] for a summary of 
commonly-used distributions.) These are similar to a normal distribution, especially when the 
mean is large, but they incorporate the asymmetry imposed by the fact that r > 0. 
In any case, the precise form of the distribution is not of great importance. It can be 
reasonably well estimated from observation of the authorized device during training. The 
most important aspect of the results is the clear differentiation between the two devices. 
Not surprisingly, trials carried out with identically manufactured devices (same brand and 
model,_ often with nearly consecutive serial numbers) showed less separation. However, in the 
majority of cases it was still possible to separate the devices by observing r-values over time. 
4.2.2 Multifractal dimensional analysis 
Higuchi [11] provides the method described in this section as a means of quantifying the ir-
regularity of a time series. The concept of fractal dimension was introduced by Mandelbrot [18] 
for this purpose; Higuchi provides a method of measurement which we describe here.l 
The idea of measuring signal irregularity was explored in the hope that signal fluctuations 
unique to a particular device would be identifiable. We will see that this method is not es-
1The fractal dimension is an alternative to the power-law index; for a signal whose spectrum (roughly) follows 
the relation P(f) oc f - a, the value of a can be considered to quantify the irregularity of the series. However, 
as described in the introduction to [11], this method does not perform well when applied to statistcally non-
stationary processes. Also, it is clear that the spectrum of a DILON signal does not follow this law. 
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pecially useful for the type of time-series data analyzed in the present thesis. It is included, 
however, not only in the interest of completeness but because it offers some interesting possi-
bilities for use with signals from wireless network devices it has been successfully applied in 
the identification of other types of radio-frequency devices [10, 25, 27]. 
4.2.2.1 Description of the method 
Higuchi's method is based on the calculation of the lengths of curves defined by the time 
series data X (1), X (2), X (3), .. . , X (N). The curve length is defined as 
{ =i 2=1 N-1 [ N ~ m ~ •k /~ (4.6) 
where [•] represents the integer part of a number, m denotes initial time, and ~ denotes interval 
time. Careful examination reveals that we have constructed ~ subset series m defines the 
starting point of each series, which then continues with every 1~-th element of the original 
series. One may represent the subseries as X~ ,defined as 
Xk ; X (m), X (m + k), X (m + 27~), . . . , X I m + 
~N ~ ml ~1 
J J (4.7) 
where m = 1, 2, . . . , k and [•] again denotes the integer part of the value in brackets. 
Once the subseries curve lengths Lr,,,(k) are computed from Eq. 4.6, the length of the 
original time series for interval time k, (L(k)), is defined as the average of L„Z (1~) over the 
k subseries. If a log-log plot is made of (L(k)) vs. k and a straight line emerges, one may 
surmise that (L(k)) a k —D and the signal has fractal dimension D (which is in the range 
1.0 < D < 2.0). In practice, a line must be fit to the points on the log-log plot, and the slope 
of this line will provide an estimate of D. 
In Figure 4.4, we illustrate an example using synthesized data similar to that presented by 
Higuchi in [11]. The signal is a segment from a cumulative sum of gaussian data with µ = 0 
and a~ = 1. The graph on the right in Figure 4.4 shows the results of the analysis. The points 
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Figure 4.4 A synthesized signal and corresponding fractal dimension anal-
ysis . 
show the values of (L(1~)~ for values of 1~ ranging from 1 to 32. The dotted line shows the 
least-squares fit to these points, which has a slope of -1.4977. Theoretically, D = 1.5 for this 
type of signal [18] . 
This method of analysis, as discussed so far, assumes that the fractal dimension of the 
signal is stationary in time. In fact, this is often not the case. What we would prefer is a 
method of measuring how the fractal dimension changes with time. When we deal with a 
varying local fractal dimension in this fashion, we are doing multifractal analysis. 
To conduct this multifractal analysis we may adopt the "sliding window" technique used 
in [25] and [27] . We first compute the local fractal dimension for successive segments of the 
signal using Higuchi's method. In order to do this, we define two parameters: S is the window 
spacing and W is the window width. The width should be large enough to provide a valid 
estimate of the dimension, but not so large as to smooth local variations in the dimension 
more than necessary. If the spacing is equal to the width, we simply compute the dimension 
of adjacent pieces of the signal. However, we may select S < W so that successive windows 
overlap. In practice, it makes sense to select S as small as possible while maintaining acceptable 
computation times. 
When the local dimensions have been computed, we can view the sequence as being the 
fractal trajectory of the signal. The hope in the context of DILON, of course, is that features 
of this fractal trajectory will provide parameters that can be used to discriminate between 
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signals originating from different devices. 
4.2.2.2 Results 
It is fairly immediately clear that this type of fractal analysis is not useful for the time-
domain DILON signal, which is highly regular. The application in the frequency domain is 
less immediately obvious. 
Given a data set for a particular device, we have a time series for each frequency bin. We 
can therefore compute the fractal dimension as a function of frequency. The result of such a 
computation for one data set is shown in Figure 4.5. Recall that cone-dimensional function 
has a fractal dimension in the range 1.0 < D < 2.0, with larger values indicating a higher 
degree of irregularity. As indicated in the figure, the dimension of our signal is very nearly 2 
at all frequencies,2 and no useful identifying information appears. 
Although the fractal dimension does not appear to be a useful means of extracting pa-
rameters for a device fingerprint, the method may prove useful in future DILON work. As 
mentioned above, it has been successful in RF device identification. Much of that work cen-
tered around transient signals when a device was powered on; such methods may apply to 
ZThe value in the graph sometimes exceeds 2.0. This is due to the least-squares fit to the data points; the 
actual signal dimension may not exceed 2.0. 
25 
technologies such as IEEE 802.11 wireless ethernet. Fractal analysis may also prove useful in 
analyzing other noise (or "pseudonoise") characteristics of a network signal. 
4.2.3 Principal and independent component analysis 
In this section we discuss the closely related methods of principal component analysis (PCA) 
and independent component analysis (ICA). These methods shaxe the common goal of attempt-
ing to find a transformation of measured signals that will reveal as much information as possible 
about the common structure of those signals. This type of separation is predicated on the as- 
sumption that the signals contain redundant information. 
Although we discuss the general ideas and methods of PCA and ICA here, complete deriva-
tions of methods (especially numerical methods for estimation) are too involved to include. A 
thorough introduction to PCA may be found in [13], and a similarly extensive treatment of 
ICA, which also includes a chapter on PCA, is [12]. 
4.2.3.1 Principal component analysis 
In PCA, the input samples axe transformed into statistically uncorrelated components. If 
we have n samples, we could produce as many as n princpal components (which could be 
recombined to recover the original signals), but if the signals are significantly correlated, many 
fewer than n components will contain the majority of the variation in the signals. This fact 
is useful, for example, in flossy) data compression, where the first few principal components 
may be used to represent a signal. 
There exist a number of ways to compute or estimate principal components for real-world 
signals, but the method of vaxiance maximation described here (following [12] and [13]), pro-
vides some meaningful insight into the process. We first consider the case of a single observation 
of a random vector x. We consider this to be a column vector of n elements, and will later 
consider the case of multiple observations x(1) . . . x(T).3
3In the case of multiple observations of time-series data, there can easily arise some confusion about what 
the rows and columns represent. For our analysis, the mth column vector represents the n samples at position 
m of a sample record; in other words, each element of x(t) represents a different sample record. 
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As a preprocessing step, x must be centered by subtracting the mean from each element. 
Since we are unlikely to know the true mean, we subtract the sample mean of the time-series 
x(t) from x. In the following discussion, we assume x to have been so centered. 
We now move on to consider the transformation 
n 
~_ 
1~=1 
T w~x~ = w x, ~4.g~ 
which is simply a weighted sum of the elements of x. The elements of the vector w are the 
weighting coefficients, and the notation wT represents the transform of w. If we can assure 
that the variance of y is as large as possible, then y will be (by definition) the first principal 
component of x. The problem then is to find w such that the variance of y is maximized. In 
order to do this in a sensible manner, we must impose the condition that the magnitude of the 
weight vector remain constant. We therefore insist that ~w~ = 1 and compute the vaxiance of 
~~ 
E{y2} = E{(WTX~2} = WTE{XXT}W = WTC XW (4.9) 
where we note that the covariance of x, CX, is equal to the correlation E{xxT } because x has 
been made to have zero mean. 
We can maximize the value given in (4.9) by using the method of Lagrange multipliers [13] . 
In order to maximize wTCXw subject to the constraint that ~ w ~ =wTw = 1, we maximize 
the expression 
wTCXw — .~(wTw — 1) (4.10) 
where ~ is a Lagrange multiplier. This is done by differentiating with respect to w and setting 
the result4 equal to zero: 
d 
dw 
~wT CXw — ~(wTw — 1)~ = CXw — .~w = (CX — .~I)w = 0 (4.11) 
where I is the identity matrix (of size n x n). Flom this we see that ~ and w are an eigenvalue-
4Here we use the vector identities dw (wTw) =wand dw (wT Aw) = Aw (where A is a constant n x n 
matrix) . 
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eigenvector pair of the covariance matrix C X . 
Because w and ~ are related in this fashion, 
WTC Xw = wT~w = ~wTw = ~. (4.12) 
From (4.12) we see that ~ represents the variance that we set out to maximize. Therefore we 
can conclude that if al is the largest eigenvalue of CX , the corresponding normalized eigenvector 
wl can be used to find the first principle component ~J1 = wl x. 
In fact, this process yields all of the principal components. If the eigenvalues and (nor-
malized) eigenvectors are sorted in order of decreasing ~, then ~~ = wTx is the lath principal 
component, where 1~ = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that because the covariance matrix CX is symmetric, 
its eigenvectors form an orthogonal basis spanning the n-dimensional vector space from which 
x is drawn. Therefore the principal component axes are perpendicular, so the components are 
uncorrelated. 
There exist other methods of computing the PCA solution which do not rely on differenti-
ation; see [13] . 
Before considering the application of PCA to DILON signals, we look briefly at the ICA 
technique. 
4.2.3.2 Independent component analysis 
Whereas the principal components are uncorrelated, independent components are, as the 
name implies, statistically independent. This stronger requirement makes ICA suitable for 
tasks such as blind source separation given a number of samples which represent various 
unknown mixtures of unknown source signals, ICA can be used to separate them. For example, 
if three (or more} microphones are used to record three people speaking simultaneously, ICA 
could separate the three voices. The underlying assumption is that signals which originate from 
distinct physical sources should provide no information about one another; in other words, they 
should be statistically independent. 
It was this ability to separate sources that originally sparked interest in ICA in the context 
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of DILON. The idea was that perhaps the "standard" ethernet signal could be separated from 
device-specific aspects of the signal by using multiple observations as input signals. 
If we have a number of observations which are the elements of a vector x, we can consider 
it as a combination of some other set of signals: 
x(t) = As(t) (4.13) 
where s represents the unknown source signals and A is the unknown matrix of mixing coef-
ficients. This is the inverse of the formulation in the previous section, where we sought the 
separation matrix W (consisting of the eigenvectors w~ of CX) rather than the mixing matrix. 
The two are equivalent, however, and A = W —1. 
The ICA problem boils down to finding the signals s(t) when the mixing matrix A is also 
unknown. The methods for doing this are the subject of entire books [12, 17, 26]; rather than 
attempting to include any of them here, we summarize the major features of ICA as given by 
the authors of [12]. 
First, ICA relies essentially on nonlinear decorrelation. In PCA, we found w by maximizing 
the variance of the components, which resulted in uncorrelated components. ICA goes beyond 
this and attempts to find W so that nonlinear tranformations of the components are also 
uncorrelated. 
Secondly, the independent components are also those which are most nongaussian. The 
central limit theorem tells us that the sum of nongaussian random variables will be closer to 
gaussian. If we are to recover independent orignal signals as a linear combination of observed 
mixtures, those original signals (the independent components) will be a maximally nongaussian 
combination of the mixtures. 
Various metrics of nongaussianity are used; a common one is the Kurtosis (the fourth-order 
cumulant) . Other high-order moments or cumulants might also be used, as they are zero for 
gaussian distributions. 
This brings up a third feature of ICA, namely that the covariance matrix C X is insufficient 
to compute the independent components. It can be used for decorellation, as in PCA, but 
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Figure 4.6 Example of PCA and ICA with synthesized data (after [17]). 
5 
2 
higher-order statistics are necessary to do more. Note that this also means that if the original 
signals in s(t) are gaussian, then ICA is no stronger than PCA because there is no differentiation 
in the high-order statistics. 
Finally, simple lineax algebra is usually not adequate to express the ICA computations, so 
numerical methods play an important role in implementing solutions. Once such algorithm is 
FastICA [8]. 
Figure 4.6 provides an example of both PCA and ICA in use.5 This illustration is modelled 
5The PCA in this and following sections was done using the pcacov function in the MA'rLAB statistics 
toolbox. The ICA was done using the FastICA routines for MA'rLAs[8]. 
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after §2.3 of [17] and is based on synthetically generated data so that the results may be 
compared to known source signals. In practice there would probably be many more than two 
variables; however, restricting ourselves to two allows easy graphical illustration. 
The two signals sl and s2 are uniformly distributed random variables between —1 and 1. 
They are mixed according to 
xl 
x2 
1 1 sl
3 1 s2 
(4.14) 
The original signals sl and s2 and the mixed signals xl and x2 axe shown in the top two 
graphs in Figure 4.6. The bottom two graphs show the PCA (left) and ICA (right) results. 
The principal components are decorrelated, but it is cleax that the principal axes are not 
independent. By contrast, the ICA has performed a rotation of the coordinate axes so that 
they axe paxallel with the original signal axes. (In both the PCA and ICA cases, the results axe 
also scaled along the component axes, which amounts to multiplication by a scalar constant.) 
Other examples using audio and image data [12, 17] dramatically illustrate the power of 
ICA to sepaxate mixed signals. 
4.2.3.3 Results 
Recall that our simple model presented at the beginning of this chapter proposed that the 
observed signal is in fact a mixture of three components: an "ideal" signal, some device-specific 
signal, and random noise. The power of PCA and ICA to separate mixed signals was therefore 
the motivating factor in attempting to apply these methods to DILON. 
Both ICA and PCA were tested on the time-domain DILON signals. Unfortunately, even 
with a large number of observations, neither method was able to produce any useful signal 
separation. The entire signal was contained in the first principal (or independent) component, 
with the remaining components being so small in magnitude as to be meaningless. 
The failure of these tests might be due to a somewhat forced misapplication of the method. 
In order to separate the ideal signal from the device-specific signal, what we really need is two 
(or more) simultaneous observations at different points. However, we are attempting to design 
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a test that can be performed using only observations at the receiving end. 
Nevertheless, PCA and ICA may prove to be useful in future work, particularly with wireless 
devices, when simultaneous observations from different locations would be more practical. 
4.2.4 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a statistcal test that provides a measure of the probability 
that two sample distributions are drawn from the same parent distribution. In this section, we 
examine the use of this test as a means of spectral comparison. The test is applied to sets of 
spectral data acquired through the process described in Chapter 3. 
4.2.4.1 Background 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test) may be formulated either as a test to determine 
whether a sample distribution comes from a particular parent distribution, or as a test to 
determine whether two sample distributions are drawn from the same paxent distribution. 
Since our goal is to determine whether two data sets (one from a known device and one from a 
candidate device) are from the same unknown parent distribution, we will consider only that 
version of the test here. A detailed and rigorous derivation of the KS test may be found in [15]; 
a briefer and more accessible treatment may be found, for example, in [7]. 
We might more formally define the problem as follows: Suppose we have two sets of ob-
servations taken from two distributions F(x) and G(x). We wish to test the hypothesis that 
F(x) = G(x) for —oo c x < oo. 
Let us now define F~(x) and G~(x) to be the cumulative sample distributions of F(x) and 
G(x) respectively, based on the available data. Note that we need not have an identical number 
of samples; let us say we have n samples from F(x) and m samples from G(x). Now consider 
the maximum distance D between the two cdf curves: 
D = max ~Fc(x) — C*c~x)~. (4.15) 
—oo<~<oo 
This is represented in Figure 4.7 for sample data drawn from two different gaussian distribu-
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maximum distance. 
tions. The double arrow indicates D. 
Intuitively, it seems clear that if the two distributions are identical, this maximum distance 
metric should be small, and that this is more likely to be the case if the sample numbers n 
and m are large. In practice, the metric actually used in the test is a scaled version of D: 
d=D 
mn 
m+n 
This is a useful metric because of the result given in [7] that for some t > 0 
1)i-1 
e
-2i 2t2
(4.16) 
~4.17~ 
with P(•) representing the probability of the given condition being true and with d as defined 
in (4.16) . Thus we have a means of selecting a confidence level for our test. In practice, m and 
n do not need to be especially large; according to the documentation for MATLAB's kstest2 
command (which was used in DILON data analysis), the quantity under the square root in 
(4.16) need only be greater than about 4 to achieve a good estimate of the p-value. 
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4.2.4.2 Spectral comparison using the KS test 
The application of the KS test to DILON data was done in the spectral domain. The data 
set can be interpreted as a set of time series observations, each of the power at a particular 
frequency. 
We know that our number of observations (m and n in Eq. 4.16) doesn't need to be large. 
It was decided that 25 was a reasonable number that many observations can be collected 
fairly quickly, while still providing a enough information to make a meaningful comparison. 
The training session consists simply of making 25 observations of the authorized device. 
This gives a distribution at each frequency being observed. 
After these distributions are collected, monitoring begins. A new set of 25 observations is 
collected, and at each frequency, the new distribution is compared via a KS test to the stored 
distribution from the authorized device. The expectation is that if the candidate device is the 
authorized device, these distributions should match. 
4.2.4.3 Results 
Tests of a single device against itself (that is, monitoring the authorized device) did produce 
occasional rejections, but this is expected in any statistical test. In practice, an acceptable 
rate of rejection must be determined. 
When an intruder device of a different model was tested, rejection rates rose quite dramati-
cally, often to well over 90°0 of tests. Even when the intruder device was of the same make and 
model as the authorized device, the rejection rate was often much higher. However, certain 
pairs of devices still proved difficult to separate. 
Note also that this method can easily adapt to very gradual changes that might due to 
effects such as temperature. Over time, these effects might cause the rejection rate to rise un-
acceptably. However, if the stored distributions are periodically replaced by new observations 
(after they have been successfully tested) slow changes can be tolerated, while sudden changes 
will still raise an alarm. 
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4.2.5 Matched filters 
The application of matched filters to DILON was developed primarily by Ryan Gerdes. 
The description here is necessarily brief; it is laid out in detail in [9]. 
4.2.5.1 Background and method 
The frequency domain transfer function of a matched filter is defined as 
H ~W ~ _ ~A* ~W) e—~wto
P(c.~) 
~4.is~ 
where A(c~) is the Fourier transform of the authorized device signal a(t) (the superscript 
asterisk represents complex conjugation), P(w) represents the noise spectrum, and r~ is an 
arbitrary constant. If we assume the noise spectrum to be constant (additive white gaussian 
noise), then we may choose ~ to cancel it, leaving us with the simplified form 
or, in the time domain, 
(4.19) 
h(t) = a(to — t) (4.20) 
This filter can then be applied to a candidate signal ~3(t), having Fourier transform B(w). 
The frequency-domain filter output at sampling time to is then 
Mto = H(w)B(c~) = A'"(w)e—~wt~B~w~ 
The maximum output of the filter in the time domain is 
to 
~~t 0~ — fl'1t0~ ~ ~~t 0~ — ~ alT~ ~~T~ (~T 
to-T 
(4.21) 
(4.22) 
where T is the (known) period of the time-domain reference signal a(t). 
All of the signals use for the DILON analysis are time-domain signals trimmed to contain 
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only the frame preamble information. A representative signal is chosen as the reference signal 
a(t). We can see from (4.20) that our reference signal must be reversed in time and shifted by 
to to produce h(t). 
Now we produce a baseline filter output by applying the filter to the signal used to create 
it—that is, we compute the convolution h(to) ~ a(to). This baseline value would obviously 
be produced by an identical input signal; the difference between this baseline and the output 
produced by another candidate signal provides a measure of how much difference there is 
between the reference signal and the candidate signal. 
Of course, some signal variation occurs during normal operation. In order to ascertain the 
degree to which this affects the filter output, a number of observations must be made. It was 
found that passing 25 successive sample records through the filter was sufficient; an example 
of this operation is shown in Figure 4.8. This provides enough information to decide on a 
tolerance for how far we allow the filter output to shift from the original before rejecting the 
candidate signal. For details, see [9]. 
Like the KS test, this method is easily adapted to accomodate the gradual changes seen in 
normal device operation. This is done by choosing some value n (again, 25 appears reasonable) 
and requiring that the next n frames resemble the previous n frames, within the tolerance that 
has been established. 
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4.2.5.2 Results 
The application of this test to DILON data had successes similar to those of the DFV and 
the KS test methods previously discussed. When the two devices are of different models, the 
matched filter very quickly rejects the intruder card. 
When the two devices are of the same brand and model, the situtation again becomes 
difficult. Sometimes, the separation is still clear; other times, the filter outputs overlap enough 
to make a decision difficult. 
4.2.6 Summary 
Overall, it appears that the matched filter, the differential Fourier voiceprint, and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test all provide promising means of discriminating between devices. All 
three of these methods involve the novel application of techniques developed in other fields. 
Although the PCA/ICA methods and the multifractal analysis did not prove fruitful in 
the attempt discriminate between wired ethernet cards, they may be useful in the context of 
wireless devices. 
4.3 Device monitoring via sequential testing 
Once we have identified one or more appropriate signal parameters that can be used as a 
device fingerprint, we would like to have some means of monitoring these parameters over time. 
Any significant changes in the fingerprint may indicate intrusion, device tampering, passive 
line tapping, or some other condition which should be investigated. 
The difficulty, of course, lies in knowing what constitutes a significant change. This is 
complicated by the fact that a change of a particular magnitude may not be of concern if it 
takes place gradually (perhaps due to an environmental change such as temperature), whereas a 
sudden change might be considered to indicate (for example) an intrusion or possible imminent 
device failure. 
In this section we will consider monitoring under the assumption that in normal operation, 
the device characteristics will not change in any major way. We will defer consideration of 
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any environmental changes (temperature, system load, electromagnetic interference, imminent 
device failure, and so forth) that might cause variation of the signal over time. Although 
ad hoc monitoring methods may be sufficient (especially in research), the use of a rigorous and 
well-researched method such as sequential testing may be desirable in the development of a 
marketable implementation. 
4.3.1 Background 
Sequential analysis, or sequential testing, is a technique useful in areas such as quality 
assurance and process control. It is interesting to note that the monitoring of a DILON 
fingerprint is in some sense just a quality assurance problem if our fingerprint parameters) 
fall outside acceptable ranges, we consider the signal to be "defective." In the event that we 
see too many of these defective signals, we reject the lot of them; that is, we assume the remote 
device to have either malfunctioned or been tampered with. 
The fundamentals of sequential analysis were laid out by Wald in [28]. A particularly 
practical and straightforward tutorial for the methods of sequential testing in the context of 
quality assurance is the booklet by McWilliams [19] . 
The simplest quality control method is to simply take a fixed sample size and observe each 
item to see if it is "defective" by whatever definition is appropriate. If a certain percentage of 
the sample is defective, then the entire lot is rejected. It is possible to choose sample sizes and 
the allowable number of defects based on desired confidence levels and acceptable error rates. 
For the sake of efficiency, of course, one can curtail this process. If, after having observed 
only a portion of the sample, the maximum allowable number of defects has been exceeded, 
then the lot may be rejected without inspecting the remainder of the sample. 
We can apply a similar concept to DILON. Although we aren't dealing with a "lot" which 
must be accepted or rejected, we may at any time collect a number of samples and inspect 
them. If too many of them appear to be defective (meaning, perhaps, that they failed one of 
the tests presented in X4.2), we may "reject the lot" by raising an alarm condition. 
These tests (and other, more sophisticated versions) involve fixed sample sizes. Even if 
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we use the curtailed test, we still end up observing the entire sample if it is ultimately ac-
cepted. Sequential testing, on the other hand, usually allows us to make a decision using fewer 
observations. 
During the sequential testing process, a decison is made to take one of three courses of 
action: stop testing and reject the lot, stop testing and accept the lot, or continue testing. 
This decision is based on the lil~elihood ratio, which we now describe in the context of DILON. 
In DILON we have the null hypothesis Ho that the observed card is in fact the authorized 
card. Our alternative hypothesis H1 is that the card is an intruder. We may define the 
lil~elihood functions f o (x, I~) and f l (x, l~), which simply give the probability that the assocated 
hypothesis is true. (The vector x contains the 1~ observations made so far.) 
The precise form of the likelihood functions depends on the probability distributions in-
volved in the observation process; a number of practical examples are given in [19] . In any 
case, the likelihood ratio is defined as 
.f~ (X, ~) (4.23) 
A large value of R~ then indicates that Hl is true, while a small value points to Ho. Intermedi-
ate values require more testing. The remaining problem is then to choose threshold or boundary 
values which define when R~ is "small," "large," or "intermediate." Again, McWilliams [19] 
provides examples, including simplified approximations. The rejection and acceptance bound-
aries can be determined based on acceptable error rates and confidence levels. 
4.3.2 An example 
We conclude with an example illustrating the application of sequential testing. One of the 
formulations of the test presented in [19] is a test of a process mean. In a DILON application, 
the data observations will come from a test similar to those presented in this chapter. We will 
use a hypothetical fingerprint paramater, and assume that its mean and variance have been 
estimated through training observations. 
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The test is designed to test an increase in the mean via the hypotheses 
HO ~ l~ - /~0 VS. Hl ~ %~ = I~ 1 (4.24) 
with µl > µo. The observations of the parameter (call it x) are taken one by one, and we put 
the test in terms of the cumulative mean xk = ~i x. After the lath observation, we make a 
decision: 
• Stop and reject Ho if x~ > s + h2/1~ 
• Stop and accept Ho if xk < s — hl /k 
• If neither of the previous conditions are met, continue sampling. 
The values used in the test are defined in terms of statistical parameters and error rates: 
s 
a 
b 
hl
h2
µo+µl 
2 
1nl l a ~I 
\ / 
In ~~ Q a~ 
~2b 
~1 — ~o 
~ Za 
/-~1 - 1~0 
where a and ~ represent the desired false acceptance and false rejection rates, respectively, of 
the sequential test. 
Figure 4.9 illustrates an example of this test with ~o = 10, µ1 = 11, ~2 = 2, cx = 0.05, 
and ~ = 0.1. In this particular case, the test would terminate successfully after the eighth 
sample point, which lies beneath the accept boundary. Note how we may alter the boundaries: 
increasing ~1 will shift them upward; adjusting a and ,C3 can move them closer together or 
farther apart. 
The test presented here can be reformulated to test for a decrease in the mean rather than 
an increase. It is then a simple matter to conduct the two tests simultaneously in order to test 
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Figure 4.9 A sequential testing example; Ho : µ = 10 vs. Hl : ~ = 11 
whether the mean has moved outside an acceptable range. 
The simplified test presented here may seem somewhat arbitrary and mysterious; [l9] 
provides references to more rigorous presentations of these and other sequential techniques. 
Many of these followed from [28] in the 1950s. 
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5. FUTURE WORK 
The work presented in this thesis represents a preliminary study. As such, it leaves opens 
a number of possible avenues for future research. 
In order to be useful as a security tool, any fingerprinting method must function in a 
real-world network. This means it needs to work with currently used technology, including 
100 Mbit/sec and 1 Gbit/sec ethernet as well as wireless (IEEE 802.11) ethernet. 
These protocols are structured very differently from the 10 Mbit/sec ethernet used in the 
present work. For example, the higher-speed wired ethernet protocols use a synchronization 
signal which is present even when no data are being transmitted. The methods presented in 
Chapter 4, as well as other novel methods which may yet be developed, must be adapted to 
these differeing formats. 
High-speed protocolsl also require improvements in data acquisition. In the laboratory, this 
will mean using oscilloscopes with better resolution in both time and voltage measurements. 
Significant work is required to identify and understand the effect of various environmental 
factors on the observed signal. For example, preliminary observations have already indicated 
that a change in ambient temperature of only one or two degrees centigrade can have a signif-
icant effect on the output of some testing methods. Other factors which might have an effect 
are computational load on the system, activity of peripheral devices (especially hard drves), 
slight variations in supply voltages, and ambient electromagnetic activity. 
In addition to the above, wireless technologies will present other challenges. Our environ-
ment is increasingly saturated with electromagnetic signals from a vast array of both portable 
and fixed wireless devices. Wireless networking devices are obviously already capable of pluck-
1 We use the phrase "high-speed protocols" with apologies to future readers who might not find such termi-
nology applicable to 1 Gbit/sec data transmission. 
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ing the signal of interest from the surrounding radio-frequency cacophony; however, it will 
be necessary to understand how that signal might be affected by its environment and by the 
filtering applied to it 
As the technology matures, a customized system will have to be developed. This will be 
a design which can be incorporated into routing equipment. It will comprise data acquisition, 
data reduction, storage, and monitoring functions. This design will doubtless present both 
hardware and software challenges. 
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